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Europe Will Form a Momentary Union ... Eventually
Abstract
While I have just shown many problems along the EC's path to integration, I still feel positively about the
formation of monetary union. Germany has continued to remain strong in its backing of the union and its
support of it. France has even endured significant unemployment and social unrest due to its policy
decisions aimed at being able to meet the convergence criteria. France and Germany have also shown
cooperation in forming the union.
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Europe Will Form a Monetary Union

...Eventually

Tina Beaird
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The issue has been discussed almost to
exhaustion: Will the European Community
(EC) ever achieve monetary union? To
address this issue we need to look at the
political and economic reasons for integration
as well as the many obstacles that the countries
must face as they aim for monetary union. It
is my opinion that monetary union in the EC
will be achieved. However, I am not sure
whether or not it will actually take place by
1999, the date set in the Maastricht Treaty.
This treaty lays th guidelines the countries are
to follow in order to join the union. It is also
not possible to tell how many of the current
EC member countries will join the European
Monetary Union (EMU) when it does form
because it is likely that many will not be close
enough to meeting the requirements. There
are many reasons why the countries should
integrate and there have been many steps taken
towards the unification. But the countries are
not without their fears and fictions, and to this
day full monetary union seems distant.
By integrating, it is hoped the countries
will have political, economic, and social
progress without restrictions on the movement
of goods, services, capital, and people. The
countries are expected to be strengthened by
unity. Fair and effective competition will raise
the standard of living. As a monetary union,
there will be less uncertainty of exchange
rates, thus trade and investment in the
countries should increase as business there will
be easier and less costly. The societies will
also save in the way of transaction costs,
information costs (incurred when one has to
develop a sense of what a reasonable price for
an item is in another currency), and social
cohesion costs. This final cost will be
eliminated by the fact that with a single
currency countries may lose some of their
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national identity or unity. By doing so their
purchasing decisions will not be based on their
desire to see only their country's economy
succeed, but rather the decisions will be made
based on the benefit of the union as a whole.
A single currency will make it easier to
manage common EC institutions as well as
create a more stable internal price level for the
union. In addition, the countries will have a
single inflation rate which is expected to be
relatively low.
While these advantages of forming the
EMS exist, the transition towards unionization
has not been without its troubles and doubts.
On a political level, the countries fear giving
up much of their power to supranational
governing institutions. These institutions act
independently of the national governments so
that decisions made will be implemented by all
the member nations without their individual
say in the matter. But, in laying out the
groundwork for these institutions, it seems the
countries d y do not have much to fear. The
actions the European Council can take when a
country's economic situation may be
jeopardizing the operation of the monetary
union are weak. The Council is expected to
make recommendations to the country, but
does not have any certain strict rules to make
the country follow. Another example of the
weak response of the Council is when a
country runs a high budget deficit. There are
numerous steps that could take years to follow
through with before any fine is actually
demanded of the country. I think that the
weak actions the supranational institutions can
take against individual countries should not be
too much of a wony for the individual
countries and I do not see this as a hindrance
towards union.
There are also many real economic fears.
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As a monetary union the countries will not
have the abiity to make independent monetary

policies to boost their economies. They also
will have very Iittle fiscal policy fieedom.
These policy decisions will be left up to the
Central Bank and other governing institutions
of the EMS. Countries fear that the decisions
made by these institutions may not always be
beneficial to them and may hurt their economy.
They fear that the decisions may be made by
the dominant country at the time, and in that
country's best interests, instead of for the
benefit of the union as a whole.
Currently, the countries fear a "German
Europe."
They fear that because of
Germany's strength and influence in Europe
right now, the political and economic decisions
would be made in Germany's interest and at
the expense of the other countries. This might
mean that other countries would continue to
suffer with recessions and unemployment
while Germany suffers little economic
troubles. This fear is strengthened by the past
actions of Germany such as when it raised its
interest rates in the early 1990s because of its
increased spending in East Germany. Since
Germany was the anchor of the fixed exchange
rate system at the time, the other countries
were forced to increase their interest rates as
well, leading to deeper recessions for them and
also making their goods less competitive.
There have atso been other frictions on the
path to monetary integration. The Italian and
Spanish crises in 1992 caused these two
countries' currencies to lose their
competitiveness. Since their price levels
diverged so much fiom Germany's,
.the countries' ability to
speculators bet a
keep their currencies at their current values
and forced devaluations that were much
greater than they would have needed to be to
remain in the fixed exchange rate system.
With a common currency, though, the value of
the currency would be the same in all the
countries, hence a crisis like this would not
occur. Another crisis occurred in France and

Britain due to their high unemployment rates.
While the monetary authorities widened the
exchange rate bands so that speculators would
not be able to have a significant impact on the
currencies, the countries were still suffering
very high unemployment. Britain gave up and
dropped out of the EMS. This has definitely
added to the fiction of monetary integration
because it shows the little faith or will some
countries have in forming the monetary union.

"Many countries are forced to
make economic choices that
are causing severe unrest and
unemployment."
The Maastricht Treaty also creates
frictions in countries because of its stated
convergence criteria that countries must meet
in order to join the EMU. The "policy
paradox" it presents forces countries to suffer
at the expense of trying to meet the
convergence criteria. The countries do not
have monetary policy powers and are
constrained in their use of fiscalpolicies. They
cannot implement fiscal policies to stimulate
their economy in order to get output and
unemployment levels where they want them
because in order to meet the criteria their debt
and deficit must not be more than 60% and 3%
of their GDP, respectively. The Treaty also
sets criteria regarding the inflation rate and the
long-term interest rate of a country. Also, a
country cannot have devalued its currency in
the two years prior to joining the EMU. This
means that many countries are forced to make
economic choices that are causing severe
unrest and unemployment for their citizens.
Whether the convergence criteria will
actually be met by many of the countries by the
date required (January 1, 1999) is
questionable. Currently the deficit to GDP
ratio requirement is only met by Luxembourg,
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although Germany and the Netherlands are
close to meeting it. Greece and Italy, on the
other hand, are far fiom the requirements. The
debt to GDP ratio is currently met by France,
Germany, Luxembourg, ~ritain,&d Spain.
Portugal and Denmark are not far fiom
reaching the goal. Others are quite far fiom
the criteria. There is still time for more
countries to converge in more of the criteria
areas. As the date approaches I think more
and more of them will come closer to meeting
the criteria.
Germany remains strong in its stance that
it will not allow members to enter the union
without meeting the criteria. However, I
believe that when the time comes, Germany
will decide to be more loose on its demands.
Right now Germany must remain tough. If it
didn't, then the other countries would have no
reason to continue trying to meet the criteria.
It is true that the closer the countries are to the
convergence criteria the better the union
'
would finction and the more effective the
implementation of various policies would be
for the overall welfare of the union.
"The criteria are intended to guarantee the
convergence of inflation rates and the
imposition of a measure of fiscal rectitude
prior to monetary unification. As such, they
are not prerequisites for currency union, only
of a currency union that works in the way
those who specified the conditions hope it
will" (Copeland, 1994). So, if all the countries
do not meet the Maastricht convergence
criteria then it does not necessarily mean that
the EMS will not be able to be successful. It
merely means that right now the criteria are
considered to be the characteristics that will
make the union work best. I think the
countries should try to be as close to the
requirements as possible. However, there
must be some leniency allowed in deciding
acceptance to the EMS. Otherwise, it may
never form. It is also possible that it could
allow 'associate membershid for non-m
,.+qualifiers. These members would have more
t

lax criteria but the benefits and aid would
probably also be less than if they were full
members. This would not be as sound an
economic decision but would be less risky than
if they were full members ("EMU," 1996).
While I have just shown many problems
along the EC's path to integration, I still feel
positively about the formation of monetary
union. Germany has continued to remain
strong in its backing of the union and its
support of it. France has even endured
significant unemployment and social unrest
due to its policy decisions aimed at being able
to meet the convergence criteria. France and
Germany have also shown cooperation in
forming the union.
Other positive steps for monetary union
are the Schenegen Agreements reached
between France, Germany, and the Benelux
countries. Due to the implementation of these
agreements in 1995, there are presently no
border checks between these countries. There
exists much more cooperation between the
countries and an overall increased ease of
dealings between them Countries that are not
a part of this group still face the same
treatment as they always have. "And let this
be food for thought in some capitals, London
and elsewhere, as Schenegen is proving that
one cannot prevent one group of countries
fiom moving fonmrd, if they really wish to do
so" (Reuter, 1995).
This shows the
seriousness of these countries in working
together and forming a union. It is a definite
step in the right direction.
It is also a good sign to know that plans
are in the works for the new currency to be
used in the union. The currency has a name,
the ewo, and designs of it are being drafted.
Work is being put into managing the transition
and looking into the costs of rewriting
computer programs ("Vial," 1995). These
too, are signs that Europe is on its way to
monetary union.
Another important issue that has arisen
recently is the two-tier approach to monetary
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union. In this approach some countries, the
stronger ones, would form the first tier and
would operate with a single currency. The
second-tier countries would not be so tightly
held to the first tier's currency but would also
be a union of sorts. This can be seen as
positive because the first-tier countries are the
ones with the most similarities in economic
cycles and fiscal policy positions. It is
important that the countries be similar in these
ways so that monetary and fiscal policies are
beneficial for more than one country. These
countries also tend to be closer to meeting the
convergence criteria. When the second-tier
countries come closer to meeting the
requirements then they too could join the core
group. This arrangement would allow some of
the EU countries to move forward and benefit
from unionization. Their strength ~uld then
make it easier for other countries to join later.
I feel that the benefits outweigh the costs
in the fonnation of monetary union in the EU.
I also think that the majority ofEU countries
believe the same. It is difficult, however, for
them to make the necessary sacrifices in their
countries to meet the criteria. Not every
country is as economically healthy as
Gennany. I expect that the stronger countries
(Germany, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Austria)
will be able to, and will find it in their best
interests, to fonn a monetaJy union possibly by
1999. Once these countries take the big step
forward I expect that the other countries will
not want to be left behind and will also find it
in their best interest to strengthen their
economies so they too can join. With a
powerful Germany leading the way, I feel that
monetary union will occur.
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